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S E C R E T AMMAN 006785

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NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR S, D, M, AND NEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2012

TAGS: [PREL](#) [ASEC](#) [US](#) [JO](#)

SUBJECT: LESSENING THE BLOW TO THE GOJ OF MOVING TO
AUTHORIZED DEPARTURE

REF: A. AMMAN 6784

[1](#)B. AMMAN 6695

Classified By: Amb. Edward W. Gnehm for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D)

[1](#)1. (S) If the Department approves our request for authorized departure (ref A), we need to consider carefully how to soften the political impact of this decision on Jordan. We should take steps to reassure the King and government that the U.S. continues to attach great value to the relationship, and that authorized departure will not damage our commitment to Jordan. We will also have to consider carefully our public line and the impact it will have on the perception of the United States in Jordan and the region.

CALL FROM THE SECRETARY

[1](#)2. (S) If the Department decides to approve authorized departure, and after the Ambassador has reported that decision to King Abdullah, we recommend that the Secretary call the King to reaffirm our strong commitment to Jordan -- especially our continued work on supplemental military and economic assistance packages -- and our intent to continue with the broad range of programs and exchanges in which we currently engage, including the availability of public services such as visas. The Secretary should thank the King for the considerable security resources the GOJ has devoted to protecting the American community. He should explain that the authorized departure decision does not represent a loss of confidence in the government, its security forces, or its commitment to protect Americans, but is rather a mechanism to give a limited number of staff and family members the option to leave post. Likewise, we recommend that A/S Burns and/or other senior USG officials subsequently reiterate these points to PM Abul Ragheb, Foreign Minister Muasher, and other senior officials (including a possible call from DCI Tenet to GID Director Kheir).

MAINTAINING HIGH LEVEL OF EXCHANGES

[1](#)3. (S/NF) It will be important that we demonstrate to the Jordanians early on and in concrete terms that authorized departure does not mean a lessening of the significant and profitable bilateral programs we have in many different areas: military, intelligence, assistance, economic, law enforcement, training, and political. We need to ensure that, to the maximum extent possible, we maintain these exchanges at current levels. Many of these exchanges rely heavily on TDY personnel, however, and continuation of many programs will therefore require a continued flow of TDY support to the Mission from a number of agencies, including AID, ORCA, DOD, FBIS, and others. We need to examine putting in place special arrangements to streamline and facilitate the approval of TDY travel from State and other agencies.

PUBLIC POSTURE

[1](#)4. (S) Our public posture on authorized departure should be low key, but should reiterate our private message. We recommend including the following points:

-- The decision results from an overall assessment of the security situation in the wake of the Foley assassination.

-- Jordanian security forces are making extraordinary efforts to provide protection for Americans in Jordan, and to identify and bring to justice the killers of Larry Foley. We are confident those efforts will ultimately be successful.

-- The decision is not an evacuation and will not result in the closure of the Embassy or reduction of public services in any way. It is rather a device to allow some in the Embassy community to exercise the option to leave post.

